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LOYALTY LOSES GROUND TO MARKET
FREEDOM IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
DANIEL HARRIS*
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a much
less moralistic and much more market-oriented approach to questions of fiduciary loyalty. In cases involving fiduciaries with conflicts of interest, the Court has shifted the burden of proof to the party
claiming unfair treatment, thereby protecting deals and making
loyalty harder to enforce. The Court has also struck down or narrowly construed laws designed to prevent disloyalty by fiduciaries
on the theory that broad prohibitions on business conduct encroach
on constitutionally protected freedoms.
This Article discusses how the Supreme Court’s new approach
represents a departure from the Court’s own precedents and from
the fiduciary principles still followed by the State courts. The Article also considers how the changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence
reflect changing attitudes toward loyalty in this country, particularly among the financial elites.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, there has been a “renaissance” of scholarly interest in fiduciary theory,1 including a spate of articles
pushing for stricter scrutiny of fiduciaries.2 During this same time,
the U.S. Supreme Court has taken federal law in precisely the opposite direction, by rejecting or refusing to follow old rules designed
to safeguard fiduciary loyalty.3
The Supreme Court’s trend is most evident in cases involving
fiduciaries accused of profiting at the expense of those they were
supposed to protect.4 The traditional standard requires such fiduciaries to prove they have not taken unfair advantage of the powers entrusted to them.5 But in recent cases, the Supreme Court
shifted the burden of proof to the party claiming unfair treatment, protecting deals and making loyalty harder to enforce.6
The trend may also be seen in decisions striking down or
narrowly construing laws banning corporate campaign expenditures or prohibiting dishonesty by fiduciaries.7 The Court held that
these laws could only be used to stop fiduciaries from taking personal bribes in exchange for official action.8 Broader use against
See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory:
A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1822 (2016) (“‘Fiduciary political theory’ is a burgeoning intellectual project that uses fiduciary principles to analyze aspects of
public law.”); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513, 516 (2015) (“Fiduciary theory is undergoing a renaissance.”).
2 Articles urging expansion of the fiduciary principle include Isaac D. Buck,
Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1043 (2016); Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing American
Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715 (2011);
D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 672 (2013).
3 See Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 351 (2010); Skilling v.
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 384–85 (2009); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S.
105, 116 (2008); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233–34 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 656–57 (1880); Michoud v.
Girod, 45 U.S. 503, 553–55 (1846).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1957).
6 See, e.g., Jones, 559 U.S. at 347; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 116–17.
7 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
8 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408–09.
1
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other forms of disloyalty, the Supreme Court held, improperly encroached on constitutionally protected freedoms.9
Taken together, these decisions show a general trend that
has been overlooked in the academic literature.10 In a wide variety
of settings, the Supreme Court has prioritized contract norms over
fiduciary principles and market freedom over precedent.11
Put in terms of fiduciary theory, the Supreme Court is seeing fiduciary relationships as increasingly closer to contractual
ones.12 For the Court, the special obligations of fiduciaries seem
to be getting smaller.13 Good or bad, the trend is big news.
Part I of this Article shows that the recent cases represent
a major change in how the Supreme Court regulates fiduciaries.
Part II puts the trend into a larger context: the Court’s new approach is at odds with traditional loyalty norms still enforced by
state courts and supported by most scholars, but it is consistent
with a more transactional approach to relationships, contractarian legal scholarship, and the evolving views of financial elites.
I. FIDUCIARY LOYALTY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
A. The Traditional Standard for Regulating Fiduciary Conflicts
To appreciate how much the Supreme Court’s recent decisions depart from past practice, it is first necessary to understand
the traditional standard for regulating fiduciary conflicts of interest that the Supreme Court has recently chosen not to follow.
Let us begin with some basics. A fiduciary is a person (such as
See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408–09, 412; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
328–29.
10 Some commentators, however, have seen the connection between a small
subset of the recent loyalty decisions: the criminal corruption cases like Skilling
and the campaign finance cases like Citizens United. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman,
A Theory of Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947 (2017); Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken
Institutional Battle Over Anti-Corruption: Citizens United, Honest Services,
and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2010).
11 See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410; Jones, 559 U.S. at 351; Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 554 U.S. at 116; Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–35 (2000).
12 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 431, 443–44 (1993).
13 See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410; Jones, 559 U.S. at 351; Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 116; Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231–32.
9
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an agent or trustee) who has been entrusted with authority or resources to use for the benefit of another person (whom we can call
a “principal”).14 The duty of loyalty is the fiduciary’s obligation to
remain faithful to that charge and use the entrusted resources
and authority solely for the benefit of the principal.15
In the words of Section 170(1) of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts: “The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”16 Or as
Section 387 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency puts it when
describing the duty of loyalty for agents: “Unless otherwise agreed,
an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency.”17
Fiduciaries who simply take money from the till and put
it into their own pockets are clearly violating their duty of loyalty.
But what if the fiduciary uses entrusted authority to effectuate a
transaction that confers a personal benefit on the fiduciary? According to the traditional rule, such a conflict of interest transaction is illegal unless the fiduciary proves that he or she made a
complete disclosure of all material facts and that the transaction
was substantively fair to the principal.18
In the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
this rule as a matter of common law and equity.19 For example,
in Michoud v. Girod,20 decided in 1846, executors of an estate sold
property of the estate to a dummy purchaser who then sold the
property to the executors five days later. The Court held the concealed self-dealing transaction was illegal because under “the morality and policy of the law” and the rule of equity “in every code
of jurisprudence with which we are acquainted, that a purchase
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Id.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1957).
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1957); see also
Rave, supra note 2, at 695 (“This exclusive-benefit principle is the heart of the
fiduciary relationship.”).
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1957);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1957); see also
Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949).
19 See Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1880); Michoud v. Girod,
45 U.S. 503, 553 (1846).
20 Michoud, 45 U.S. at 508, 565.
14
15
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by a trustee or agent of the particular property of which he has the
sale, or in which he represents another ... carries fraud on the face of
it.”21 The Supreme Court explained: “The general rule stands upon
our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in
relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest
and integrity.”22 The Court went on to explain that if an executor
wants to purchase property from the estate, the executor should
do so after full disclosure and court approval based on proof that
the transaction is in the best interest of the beneficiaries.23
The Court reaffirmed these principles in 1880 in another
self-dealing case.24 The executive directors of the Union Pacific Railroad set up a coal company that they personally (and secretly)
owned.25 The directors then authorized a contract between the railroad and that coal company that gave the coal company the right
to mine coal on land owned by the railroad and then sell the coal
back to the railroad at a profit.26 In a unanimous opinion authored
by Justice Field, the Court said that the transaction was “utterly
indefensible and illegal” because the directors’ “character as agents
forbade the exercise of their powers for their own personal ends
against the interest of the company.”27
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court repeatedly read
these principles into the silences and ambiguities of federal statutory law.28 A prime example is the 1939 decision in Pepper v.
Litton.29 The dominant shareholder of a coal company secured a
judgment against the company for unpaid wages and a supporting
lien that, according to a state court, gave him priority over other
creditors of the company.30 A federal bankruptcy court, however,
disallowed the dominant shareholder’s claim because of his fiduciary relationship to the company.31 The Supreme Court affirmed,
Id. at 553.
Id. at 555.
23 Id. at 557–58.
24 Wardell, 103 U.S. at 651, 657–58.
25 Id. at 654–55, 657.
26 Id. at 653–54, 656–57.
27 Id. at 657–58.
28 See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939).
29 See generally Pepper, 308 U.S. 295.
30 Id. at 297–301.
31 Id. at 301.
21
22
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holding that because of the conflict of interest, the transaction was
subject to rigorous scrutiny with the controlling shareholder having the burden of proving substantive fairness.32
The unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas explained that,
under equitable principles incorporated into the federal bankruptcy law, the dominant shareholder had the burden
not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show
its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and
those interested therein. The essence of the test is whether or not
under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks
of an arm’s length bargain.33

The Court went on to explain that the fiduciary cannot “violate
the ancient precept against serving two masters .... He cannot
use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of
the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms
that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements.”34 The “ancient precept” referenced in the
Court’s opinion justifying the overriding duty of loyalty came from
the Gospel of Matthew in the New Testament: “No man can serve
two masters.”35
In the waning years of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court continued to follow the traditional standard, although with
less moralistic verve.36 For example, in 1981, the Court remanded
a criminal case for further review because of concern that there
might be a conflict of interest between criminal defendants and
their lawyer, who was being paid by the defendants’ former employer.37 None of the parties had raised the conflict issue, but the
Court thought that it deserved a hearing.38 The opinion by Justice Powell in Wood v. Georgia explained: “Where a constitutional
right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there
is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306–07 (citations and footnotes omitted).
34 Id. at 311.
35 Id. at 295; Matthew 6:24 (King James).
36 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996); Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd.
v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1981); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S.
261, 271–72 (1981).
37 Wood, 450 U.S. at 267–68, 270–71.
38 Id. at 267–68.
32
33
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interest. ... Here, [the defendants’ lawyer] may not have pursued
their interests single-mindedly.”39
In another 1981 case, National Labor Relations Board v.
Amax Coal Company, involving the interpretation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Court said: “To
deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible
injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his
loyalties must be enforced with ‘uncompromising rigidity.’”40 Those
general principles had to be read into ERISA, the Court said, because “we must infer that Congress intended to impose on trustees
traditional fiduciary duties unless Congress has unequivocally
expressed an intent to the contrary.”41
The Court also took a broad view of fiduciary responsibility
in a 1996 case, Varity Corporation v. Howe.42 Varity decided to spin
off its money-losing divisions into a new company and to urge
employees to work for that spin-off.43 After the spin-off failed, the
employees sued claiming that the employer had been acting in its
capacity of an ERISA fiduciary when it assured them that their
benefits would be safe with the new company.44 Varity argued
that it was acting in its capacity as an employer and was therefore not subject to a fiduciary duty.45
The Supreme Court sided with the employees.46 The statute made a person an ERISA fiduciary “‘to the extent’ that he or
she ‘exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management’ of the plan, or ‘has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration’ of
the plan.”47 Conveying information about likely future benefits
was sufficiently related to the management of the plan to impose
a fiduciary duty, the Court held, since reasonable employees could
have thought that Varity was communicating to them both in its
capacity as employer and its capacity as an ERISA fiduciary.48
Id. at 271–72.
Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd., 453 U.S. at 329–30.
41 Id. at 330.
42 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498, 503 (1996).
43 Id. at 493.
44 Id. at 494.
45 Id. at 495.
46 Id. at 503.
47 Id. at 498.
48 Id. at 503.
39
40
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The Court held that it was irrelevant that the challenged
statements were not required by the ERISA statute or plan.49 The
duty of loyalty, the Court explained, imposed obligations on fiduciaries that go beyond the letter of the contract or the positive
law.50 “If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve
no purpose.”51
Campaign finance might seem far afield from our theme
of fiduciary loyalty. But consider that elected officials are fiduciaries of their constituents. They exercise power that has been
entrusted to them to serve others. They are public servants. Like
other servants, they are supposed to be loyal to their masters, which
for them is the public. Large campaign contributions are dangerous
because the money might corrupt that loyalty to the public by inducing officials to favor those who pay them over those the officials
are supposed to represent.
That, at least, was the theory the Supreme Court used in
1976 to uphold restrictions on campaign contributions against a
First Amendment challenge.52 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme
Court said the restrictions were justified “to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions” reasoning that “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo from current
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”53
In 2003, the Court followed a similar approach in McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission,54 holding that the McCain Feingold
statute’s restrictions on campaign contributions were justified in
order to ensure that elected officials were loyal to their constituents and not swayed from that loyalty by the corrupting influence of
large campaign contributions.55 The Court explained: “Our cases
have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance
constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political
Id. at 504.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
53 Id.
54 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 93–95 (2003).
55 Id. at 143–45.
49
50
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contribution limits.”56 The Court went on: “Take away Congress’
authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and ‘the
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’”57
A key assumption in the Court’s analysis was that elected
officials should be loyal to their constituents, not to their large
donors.58 It followed that banning large campaign contributions
was a legitimate way to avoid the creation of a conflict between
the duty of loyalty and financial self-interest.59 The Court said:
“Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption
to curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and
the appearance of such influence.’”60
B. The Supreme Court Changes Course
And then the Supreme Court became much more deferential to (and protective of) the decisions of conflicted fiduciaries.61
With surprising unanimity (except in the politically charged campaign finance decisions), the Court’s tone and approach in loyalty
related cases underwent a sea change.62
The new era began around 2008. But there was a harbinger
of what was to come in 2000 with Pegram v. Herdrich.63 Cynthia
Herdrich experienced pain in her groin and went to see her doctor, Lori Pegram, who worked for Carle Clinic, a for-profit HMO
providing services to Herdrich pursuant to an ERISA plan.64
Six days later, Dr. Pegram discovered a six by eight centimeter
inflamed mass in Herdrich’s abdomen. Despite the noticeable
inflammation, Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound diagnostic
procedure at a local hospital, but decided that Herdrich would
have to wait eight more days for an ultrasound, to be performed
at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away. Before
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
58 Id. at 143–44.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 150.
61 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 105 (2008).
62 Id.
63 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 211 (2000).
64 Id. at 215.
56
57
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the eight days were over, Herdrich’s appendix ruptured, causing peritonitis.65

Herdrich sued for malpractice and won.66 Herdrich also
claimed a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, alleging Pegram
and Carle had an undisclosed financial interest in advising Herdrich to delay treatment until she could go to the Carle facility
and that this undisclosed conflict led Dr. Pegram to give Herdrich
bad medical advice.67 The United States Court of Appeals held that
the ERISA allegation stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted,68 but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed in an
opinion written by Justice Souter.69
Even though the HMO was within the statutory definition
of an ERISA fiduciary, the Court worried about the practical implications of treating its treatment decisions as fiduciary ones. 70
After all, the Court noted, conflicts of interest are ubiquitous.71
In this case, for instance, one could argue that Pegram’s decision
to wait before getting an ultrasound for Herdrich, and her insistence that the ultrasound be done at a distant facility owned by
Carle, reflected an interest in limiting the HMO’s expenses, which
blinded her to the need for immediate diagnosis and treatment.72

If traditional fiduciary standards were applied, the Court
noted, almost every unsuccessful treatment decision by a for-profit
HMO could be challenged as a breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA.73 That was not acceptable. There was no reason to add a
federal remedy to state law malpractice claims.74 So treatment decisions could not be subjected to fiduciary standards.75 “It is enough
to recognize that the Judiciary has no warrant to precipitate the
Id.
Id. at 215, 218.
67 Id. at 211.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 213.
70 Id. at 217–18.
71 Id. at 212.
72 Id. at 220.
73 Id. at 211, 213.
74 Id. at 235.
75 Id. at 232–34.
65
66
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upheaval that would follow a refusal to dismiss Herdrich’s ERISA
claim.”76
The Court took a similarly pragmatic approach in a 2008
ERISA decision, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn.77
ERISA benefit plans often provide that the same insurance company will act both as the decision-maker and the payor with respect
to ERISA benefit claims.78 The question before the Court was the
proper standard of review for such conflicting decisions.79 The
governing statute left this issue open for the courts to decide.80
The liberals, who prevailed, said that the conflict was a factor a
reviewing court should consider, among many other things, in
deciding whether to overturn a denial decision.81 The conservatives believed that the conflict should only be considered if there
was evidence that the conflict affected the decision.82 However,
both sides agreed that the conflicted decision should be treated
as presumptively correct and reviewed deferentially.83
The majority opinion by Justice Breyer explained that Congress had not expressly required de novo review and adopting such
a standard would pose practical problems for the courts that Congress could not have intended: “1.9 million beneficiaries of ERISA
plans have health care claims denied each year ... [there were]
257,507 total civil filings in federal court in 2007 ... Congress does
not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’”84 Chief Justice Roberts agreed:
“the majority is surely correct in concluding that it is important
to retain deferential review for decisions made by conflicted administrators, in order to avoid ‘near universal review by judges
de novo.’”85
The 2009 Citizens United decision,86 striking down restrictions on independent corporate campaign expenditures, involved a host of issues. But the question of fiduciary loyalty was
Id. at 233.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
78 Id. at 112.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 111–12.
81 Id. at 115–17.
82 Id. at 127.
83 Id. at 121.
84 Id. at 116.
85 Id. at 121 (Roberts, J., concurring).
86 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2009).
76
77
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one of them.87 As we have seen, the main rationale for regulating
corporate campaign contributions is that the contributions are
similar to bribes in that they may induce the recipients to favor
the interests of the payors over the interests of the constituents,
which would violate the officials’ fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty
to the constituents.88
The Supreme Court rejected this loyalty argument.89 The
Court held that to avoid encroaching on the First Amendment,
the government could only prohibit quid pro quo corruption, money
for official action, or its appearance.90 Even if campaign contributors get greater access to elected officials, the Court held, the mere
selling of access to elected officials was not a form of disloyalty,
or corruption, that the government could prohibit.91 The dissent
by Justice Stevens, by contrast, took the view that “the difference
between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree,
not kind.”92 Justice Stevens, the only World War II veteran still on
the Court, also argued that a corporation might be analogized to
a foreign power, because its legal duties do not include patriotism,
so the majority’s logic giving them a constitutional right to participate in our political process “would have accorded the propaganda
broadcasts to our troops by ‘Tokyo Rose’ during World War II the
same protection as speech by Allied commanders.”93
The same theme of non-interference with conflicted fiduciaries may be seen in Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P.,94 a 2010
case involving mutual funds. A mutual fund is a pool of assets
owned by the investors in the fund.95 Typically, a mutual fund is
set up by a separate entity, an investment adviser, which selects
the directors of the fund and then negotiates its compensation
arrangement with the (supposedly) independent directors whom
it has just selected.96 The question before the Supreme Court
was how courts should review these compensation decisions under
Id. at 382, 386.
Id. at 453.
89 Id. at 379, 383.
90 Id. at 384.
91 Id. at 360.
92 Id. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94 Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 335 (2010).
95 Id. at 338.
96 Id.
87
88
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a New Deal era statute, the Investment Company Act, which
required the application of fiduciary standards.97
The Court’s opinion made it clear that judicial review of
these compensation decisions should be very deferential (essentially ignoring the old rule that put the burden of proof on the
conflicted fiduciary to prove substantive fairness).98 The Court
said that if the mutual fund directors followed normal procedures,
a judicial determination of impropriety “must be based on evidence that the fee ‘is so disproportionately large that it bears no
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not
have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.’”99 In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that the Court properly
held investor plaintiffs challenging compensation decisions to a
“heavy burden of proof ....”100
That same year, 2010, the Supreme Court dealt with another kind of fiduciary conflict in Skilling v. United States.101 Jeffrey
Skilling, the former CEO of Enron, was convicted of engaging in
a fraudulent scheme that deprived his company and its shareholders of their right to his honest services in violation of a federal statute specifically intended to protect a principal’s right to
honest services from a fiduciary.102 The Supreme Court held
unanimously that the honest services fraud conviction had to be
reversed because of vagueness concerns.103
The majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg said that the
honest services law had to be limited to bribes and kickbacks,
which was not the specific accusation against Skilling.104 “Reading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct,
we acknowledge, would raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.”105 The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the honest services law could be applied
to undisclosed self-dealing (a practice the Court had condemned
Id. at 341–45.
Id. at 352.
99 Id. at 351.
100 Id. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 358 (2010).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 368.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 408.
97
98
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as obviously immoral and illegal back in 1846),106 such as the pursuit of a fiduciary’s own financial interests while purporting to
act in the interests of those to whom a duty is owed.107 The Court
explained that the government’s theory
leaves many questions unanswered. How direct or significant
does the conflicting financial interest have to be? To what extent does the official action have to further that interest in order
to amount to fraud? To whom should the disclosure be made,
and what information should it convey?108

A concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Kennedy and Justice Thomas, would have gone further and simply
struck down the honest services law as void for vagueness rather
than save it, for bribery cases, with a limiting construction.109
Justice Scalia explained that the statute was intended to incorporate lofty, grandiloquent, “astoundingly broad” moralistic language from prior lower court case law and the fiduciary duty
standard articulated in those decisions was “hopelessly undefined”
and therefore void for vagueness.110
The Court came to a similar conclusion in McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Commission,111 a 2013 case striking down a
restriction on campaign contributions. As in Skilling, the Court
drew a sharp distinction between quid pro quo bribery and kickbacks, which the law could prohibit, and other forms of disloyalty,
which the Court held to be constitutionally protected.112 The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts set the stage for its analysis by noting how the expansion of First Amendment freedoms
undercut the broader loyalty justifications for restricting campaign
contributions.113 “If the First Amendment protects flag burning,
funeral protests, and Nazi parades—despite the profound offense
such spectacles cause—it surely protects political campaign speech
despite popular opposition.”114
Id. at 409, 410.
Id.
108 Id. at 411 n.44.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 418–19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 239 (2013).
112 Id. at 237–40.
113 Id. at 196–97.
114 Id. at 191.
106
107
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The issue of loyalty and conflict of interest came before the
Supreme Court in another 2013 case, Burt v. Titlow.115 Titlow was
charged with helping her aunt kill the aunt’s husband.116 Titlow’s
lawyer negotiated a plea bargain to manslaughter that would have
gotten her a 7- to 15-year sentence.117 But a jailer heard Titlow
protest her innocence after she entered her guilty plea and advised her to get a new lawyer.118 The new counsel, Fredrick Toca,
agreed to represent Titlow and to take, as part of his payment,
the publication rights to the story of the case.119 He then advised
her to withdraw her guilty plea without reviewing the evidence
against her or even talking to her prior counsel about why he had
advised the plea bargain.120 The plea was withdrawn.121 Titlow
went to trial on the murder charge, was convicted and received a
sentence of 20 to 40 years.122 Titlow sought a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel by Toca.123 The
state courts rejected her argument, but the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with Titlow.124
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed unanimously, reinstating the conviction and holding that the federal court should have
deferred to the state court factual findings on the duty of care
issue.125 The fee arrangement between Titlow and Toca created
an obvious conflict of interest.126 Because his payment included
the publication rights to the story of the case, the lawyer Toca
had a financial interest in an exciting trial that conflicted with
his client’s interest in a quiet but favorable plea bargain.127 And
under Supreme Court precedent the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel includes the right to conflict-free counsel.128 But the
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 12 (2013).
Id. at 13.
117 Id. at 11–13.
118 Id. at 16.
119 Id. at 18.
120 Id. at 14.
121 Id. at 19.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 10.
127 Id. at 14.
128 Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 262, 272 (1981).
115
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Court managed to avoid the conflict of interest problem by focusing on the duty of care, not using the words “conflict of interest”
to describe the issue and treating the state court decision as a
finding of fact to which deference was due.129
The fee arrangement, however, did not go unnoticed. The
Court said the defense counsel might have violated professional
rules by accepting publication rights.130 Nevertheless, the Court
said, that did not amount to a constitutional violation.131 While
the defense lawyer’s conduct was “far from exemplary ... the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it
promises only the right to effective assistance, and we have held
that a lawyer’s violation of ethical norms does not make the lawyer
per se ineffective.”132
C. Something Significant Has Changed
When considered in isolation, each of these recent decisions might be explainable based on factors peculiar to the particular statute or constitutional provision at issue in that case.
But when the decisions and their rhetoric are taken as a whole
they reveal a profound change in the Supreme Court’s attitude
toward fiduciary conflicts. Consider the before and after.
In 1981, in Wood v. Georgia,133 the Supreme Court went out
of its way to recognize a potential conflict of interest between criminal defendants and their counsel and to remand the case for a
hearing, even though the defendants had not complained about
the lawyer’s conduct.134 In 2013, in Burt v. Titlow, the Court went
out of its way to ignore a serious and actual conflict of interest
between a criminal defendant and her lawyer and to reinstate a
conviction, even though the defendant was complaining bitterly
about the lawyer’s conduct.135
In 1981, in NLRB v. Amax Coal Company, the Court said
that traditional fiduciary principles had to be read into ERISA
Id. at 263–66.
Burt, 571 U.S. at 18.
131 Id. at 17.
132 Id. at 18.
133 Wood, 450 U.S. at 261.
134 Id.
135 See generally id.
129
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unless Congress clearly said otherwise.136 In 2000, in Pegram v.
Herdrich, the Supreme Court said that traditional fiduciary principles should not be read into ERISA, absent a specific Congressional command to do so, because the traditional principles were
so impractical.137
In 1939, in Pepper v. Litton, the Supreme Court said that
conflict of interest transactions involving fiduciaries are presumptively unlawful and require a heavy burden of justification as to
their substantive fairness, even if there has been perfect compliance by the fiduciary with the technical requirements of the law.138
In 2008 in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn, and
in 2010, in Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., the Supreme Court
said that conflict of interest transactions involving fiduciaries
are presumptively lawful and judicial review should normally be
very deferential.139
In 1846, in Michoud v. Girod, the Supreme Court said that
undisclosed self-dealing by a fiduciary was obviously illegal and
immoral and violative of every known code of jurisprudence.140
In 2013, in Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court said
that a federal statute specifically intended to require honesty by
fiduciaries could not be applied to undisclosed self-dealing by fiduciaries because doing so would raise due process, void for vagueness concerns.141
In 2003, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the
Supreme Court upheld restrictions on corporate campaign contributions and expenditures based on the government’s legitimate
interest in preventing corruption, including the sale of access to
elected officials.142 In 2009, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment protected corporate campaign
expenditures, even if the expenditures allowed corporations to
buy access to elected officials.143
Id. at 330.
Id. at 211–12.
138 See generally id.
139 Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 352 (2010); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 133–34 (2008).
140 See generally Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. 503 (1846).
141 See generally Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
142 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003).
143 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 340–41 (2009).
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It is also remarkable that (except for the politically charged
campaign finance cases where other considerations were in play)
the new decisions have either been unanimous or the Court has
adopted the position of its liberals, with the conservatives on the
Court wanting to go even further in reducing fiduciary oversight.
When it comes to the fiduciary loyalty, the Court seems to have
changed its mind as a group.
II. DIFFERENT WAYS OF VIEWING LOYALTY
The U.S. Supreme Court has not overturned its nineteenthcentury conflict of interest decisions, which established basic rules
of common law and equity. Those rules are still generally followed
by State courts and by federal courts following State law, except
when the old rules have been specifically modified by statute. For
example, a 2018 decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit noted that: “Under Texas law, where a fiduciary engages in a transaction with a party to whom the fiduciary
owes duties, a presumption of unfairness arises, and the burden is
placed on the fiduciary to establish that the transaction was fair.”144
But the Supreme Court is backing away from its twentiethcentury practice of reading the traditional conflict rules into the
silences and ambiguities of federal statutory and constitutional
law.145 This shift is consistent with a larger story. The old fiduciary rules were fashioned in a very different society. Ideas have
changed. Contract norms have gained ground, while loyalty (even
fiduciary loyalty) has become controversial.146
A. The Old Ideas
The modern idea of fiduciary loyalty was formed through
the merger of two traditions. One was the fiduciary responsibility of trustees as articulated and enforced by courts of equity.147
UTSA Apts. LLC vs. UTSA Apts. 8, LLC (In re UTSA Apts. 8, LLC),
886 F.3d 473, 492 (5th Cir. 2018).
145 See generally UTSA Apts., 886 F.3d at 473.
146 To be sure, the old fiduciary loyalty rules are preferred by most scholars. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law,
38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 623 (1997); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default
Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1995).
147 See Brudney, supra note 146, at 601–02; Frankel, supra note 146, at
1227 n.47, 1272 n.165.
144
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The other, evoked by the word “loyalty,” was the type of fidelity
that masters have traditionally demanded of their servants,
kings of their subjects, armies of their soldiers, and religions of
their faithful.148
Both traditions treated duty in moralistic terms and not
simply as a matter of contract. The English equity chancellors and
ecclesiastical judges who created the rules for fiduciaries described
the obligations of trustees with words like fidelity, integrity, faith
and honor.149 “The chancellor was the keeper of the king’s conscience” and a goal of equity was to prevent those acting in a fiduciary capacity from gaining unfair advantages through opportunistic
conduct.150
The loyalty obligations of servants and subjects were likewise
considered an important restraint on opportunism, as well as essential for social cohesion, trust, order, and stability.151 The alternatives were seen as frightening. Consider the Shakespeare
plays Othello152 and Macbeth153 and how disloyalty by Iago to
Othello and by Macbeth to King Duncan leads to tragedy. Or consider the emotions aroused by words like “corruption,” “treason”
or “betrayal” or by the mention of Judas Iscariot taking thirty
pieces of silver.154 There was a visceral fear that without loyalty,
society would dissolve into a war of all against all, or fall prey to
its more unified enemies.
Loyalty was designed to force moral behavior, not to facilitate deals. The analogy would be to our contemporary view of
criminal law and its moral channeling role, as described in a 1997
article by Judge Gerard Lynch: “What society wants from its
members ... is not an intelligent calculation of the costs and benefits of abiding by its basic norms, but more or less unthinking
obedience to them.”155
John Kleinig, Loyalty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (last updated Oct. 16,
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/loyalty/ [https://perma.cc/2SBF-YMTS].
149 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 829–31 (1983).
150 Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 263 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds.,
2014).
151 See id.
152 See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO.
153 See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH.
154 Matthew 26:15 (King James).
155 Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 46 (1997).
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The idea of loyalty also carried with it the notion that the
agent or servant was part of a team; an agent is an instrument
of the principal, rather than an autonomous individual.156 Because
the agent was acting as the principal’s other self, the agent owed
the principal a duty of self-abnegating, selfless devotion.157
Actual behavior, of course, often fell short of this ideal. But
the judicial response was to condemn the disloyalty, rather than
the stringency.158 In 1910, for example, the Supreme Court described the practice of government procurement officials taking
kickbacks from contractors as “utterly vicious, unspeakably pernicious, and an unmixed evil.’”159
The two traditions (fiduciary and loyalty) were brought
together in the twentieth century. The first time that the New
York Court of Appeals used the word “loyalty” to describe the
duties of a fiduciary was in a 1926 opinion by Justice Cardozo. 160
The U.S. Supreme Court followed suit in 1941 in an opinion by
Justice William Douglas.161
The merger provided rhetorical support for the idea that
corporate fiduciaries should be subject to the same type of loyalty obligations traditionally demanded of servants. For example,
in his 1914 book, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use
It, Louis Brandeis used language associated with the loyalty duties of servants (specifically the precept in Matthew 6:24 that “No
man can serve two masters”) to describe the obligations of corporate directors, stating: “The practice of interlocking directorates
is the root of many evils. It offends laws human and divine. ... [I]t
tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that
no man can serve two masters.”162 A 1934 article in the Harvard
See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 470 (1827); OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 232 (1881); Floyd Mechem, The Nature and
Extent of an Agent’s Authority, 4 MICH. L. REV. 433, 436–67 (1906).
157 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928); Frankel, supra note
149, at 795, 808, 830; Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411,
440 (2012).
158 United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 308–09 (1910).
159 Id. at 308.
160 See Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926).
161 See Woods v. Cty. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 312 U.S. 262, 269 (1941).
162 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 71 (Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 3rd ed. 1995).
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636 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:615
Law Review by Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone made
a similar reference, stating that most of the “mistakes” and “major faults” of finance in the 1920s could be “ascribed to the failure
to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ,
that ‘a man cannot serve two masters.’”163
Another example of the moralistic tone of fiduciary law may
be found in Professor Austin Scott’s classic 1949 California Law
Review article, The Fiduciary Principle.164 Professor Scott began
with a parable from the Gospel of Luke and toward the end quoted
an article referring to the Gospel of Matthew.165 In between, Professor Scott defined the duty of loyalty in moralistic terms: “In
loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined, is the [fulfillment] of the
whole moral law.”166
Professor Scott also made it clear that because of its moral
underpinnings a fiduciary relationship was quite different from
a merely contractual one.167 For example: “Where the fiduciary
does an act which would be a breach ... if he did not have the
consent of his principal, such consent will protect him only if he
has in no way taken advantage of his position as fiduciary in
procuring the consent.”168 Professor Scott explained there were
also substantive limitations on the fiduciary; “where the trustee
has an adverse interest in the transaction, the consent of the
beneficiary will not preclude him from holding the trustee liable
for a breach of trust if the transaction was not fair and reasonable.”169 Because of the fiduciary nature of the relationship, the
“consent of the beneficiary is indeed a slender reed upon which a
trustee may lean.”170
In the middle years of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court treated the idea of fiduciary loyalty as an important public policy that guided the construction of federal statutes and
justified strict regulation of financial fiduciaries.171 That attitude
Harlan Fiske Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1934).
164 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949).
165 Id. at 539, 555.
166 Id. at 540.
167 See id. at 540–41.
168 Id. at 541.
169 Id. at 542.
170 Id.
171 See United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566 (1961).
163

2019]

LOYALTY LOSES GROUND

637

is best illustrated by a 1961 Supreme Court case, United States
v. Mississippi Valley Generating Company.172
The U.S. government wanted to negotiate a contract with
a private company, the Mississippi Valley Generating Company,
for the construction of a power plant.173 The government hired a
vice president with the First Boston investment banking firm to
provide the government with advice in connection with the negotiations.174 At the time the adviser was hired, the government
knew that First Boston might help arrange financing for the construction project if the deal was signed.175 The advice was proper,
the negotiations were successful, and the resulting deal was fair.176
But the government lost interest in the project and wanted to get
out of the contract.177 So the government sued its counterparty,
Mississippi Valley, to void the contract on the ground that the First
Boston vice president who had advised the government had a conflict of interest under a criminal statute, the federal conflict of
interest law, because of the prospect that First Boston might help
arrange financing.178
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government,
with the Court’s liberals prevailing over its conservatives.179 The
opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Warren explained: “The
moral principle upon which the statute is based has its foundation in the Biblical admonition that no man may serve two masters, Matt. 6:24, a maxim which is especially pertinent if one of
the masters happens to be economic self-interest.”180
It did not matter that the adviser had acted in good faith
and that the contract was fair because the statute was “directed
not only at dishonor, but also at conduct that tempts dishonor.”181
Nor did it matter that the government had known First Boston
might provide financing for the deal and insisted that the adviser
Id.
Id. at 523.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 535–37, 555.
176 Id. at 540.
177 See id. at 565–66.
178 See id. at 554, 556–57, 559.
179 Id. at 566.
180 Id. at 549.
181 Id.
172
173
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serve anyway; “we have consistently held that no government agent
can properly claim exemption from a conflict-of-interest statute
simply because his superiors did not discern the conflict.”182
Strict enforcement was necessary, the Supreme Court explained, because “a democracy is effective only if the people have
faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”183
Finally, the Supreme Court brushed aside the problem that
the relevant law was a criminal statute that provided no civil
remedy, let alone a civil remedy against an innocent third party
that had not created, exploited or profited from the alleged conflict
of interest of the government adviser.184 The Court explained
that a remedy had to be implied because “the primary purpose of
the statute is to protect the public from the corrupting influences
that might be brought to bear upon government agents who are
financially interested in the business transactions which they
are conducting on behalf of the Government.”185
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 1963 in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau,186 once again using the concept of loyalty as a justification for strict regulation of financial fiduciaries.187 The case involved an investment adviser’s practice of buying shares of a
security for his own account, recommending that security to his
clients for long-term investment and then selling the shares at a
profit when its price rose following the recommendation.188 The
Court held that the practice, without full disclosure to clients,
constituted a fraud or deceit within the meaning of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.189 The Court reasoned that the Investment
Advisers Act was designed to “achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry”190 and “to eliminate, or at
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
184 Id. at 563.
185 Id.
186 SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 196 (1963).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 181.
189 Id. at 181–82.
190 Id. at 186.
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least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an
investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.”191
The Court regarded the investment adviser’s practice as a
conflict of interest transaction similar to self-dealing and explained the rule against conflicts of interest was not justified not
only by sound public policy but also by “the authoritative declaration that no man can serve two masters; and considering that
human nature must be dealt with, the rule does not stop with
actual violations of such trust relations, but includes within its
purpose the removal of any temptation to violate them ....”192 The
Court went on: “The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was ‘directed not only at dishonor, but also at conduct that tempts dishonor.’”193 The Court explained: “Experience has shown that
disclosure in such situations, while not onerous to the adviser, is
needed to preserve the climate of fair dealing which is so essential to maintain public confidence in the securities industry and
to preserve the economic health of the country.”194
B. From Conformity to Choice
The Supreme Court’s rhetoric about fiduciary loyalty in
Mississippi Valley and Capital Gains Research Bureau—the negative attitude toward self-interest and human nature; the talk about
moral duty, evil, dishonor and the need to avoid temptation; the
references to the Gospel of Matthew as authoritative; the broad
construction of regulatory statutes; and the idea that high ethical standards are needed to preserve public trust in the government and in the securities industry—stands in sharp contrast to
the much more pragmatic approach toward loyalty of today’s
Supreme Court.195
The differences are consistent with more general changes.
The United States in 1961 and 1963, back when the Supreme Court
decided Mississippi Valley and Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 196–97 n.50.
193 Id. at 200.
194 Id. at 201.
195 See id. at 186; United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S.
520, 548–51 (1961).
191
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was a very different country than it is now. There was less freedom, diversity, and wealth than there is now. On the other hand,
there was more economic equality, faster growth, less debt and a
much smaller fraction of the population in prison.
Workers, minorities, and intellectuals were then allies in
the political party that controlled the federal government. And
under the leadership of that party, there was a spirit of optimism,
idealism, and national unity that is hard to imagine today. In response to a poll question in 1964, 76 percent of respondents said
that the federal government could be trusted most of the time to
do what was right.196 Armed with that confidence, the federal government was dismantling Jim Crow, enacting major civil rights
legislation and getting the country more and more deeply involved
in a land war in Asia.197
Society back then was more tightly knit. The marriage rate
was higher.198 People were more apt to participate in groups, such
as labor unions, churches, political parties, and social clubs.199
Society was also much more regimented. It was a time of loyalty
oaths, restrictive divorce laws, patriarchy, hierarchy, conscription
into the military, and a general ethic of deference to authority.200
People not only belonged to groups. They generally followed the
dictates of group leaders. Loyalty was the norm and something
of an obligation.
In a 1963 article on the First Amendment in the Yale Law
Journal, Thomas Emerson described America of that time as an
Allan Murray, Foreword to LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY
LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS at
ix (1996).
197 See generally Kenneth T. Walsh, The 1960s: A Decade of Promise and
Heartbreak, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.usnews
.com/news/articles/2010/03/09/the-1960s-a-decade-of-promise-and-heartbreak.
198 Ana Swanson, 144 years of marriage and divorce in the United States,
in one chart, WASH. POST (June 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2015/06/23/144-years-of-marriage-and-divorce-in-the-united-states
-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.c4a3fcaeb919 [https://perma.cc/G5W8-UH8B].
199 See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
200 See generally Jeff Nilsson, The Price of an Organized Society: Conformity
in the 1960s, SATURDAY EVENING POST (Aug. 27, 2010), https://www.saturday
eveningpost.com/2010/08/high-price-organization-conformity-1960s/ [https://perma
.cc/Z567-TXTM].
196
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increasingly organized, “highly conformist society” in which dissenters faced “overwhelming hazards.”201 According to Professor
Emerson, “prosecutors, police and other officials charged with
maintaining internal order are left largely unrestrained” and the
“natural balance of forces in society today tends to be weighted
against individual expression.”202
And then America changed. Among other things, the norms
supporting the old loyalty culture (such as group conformity and
deference to authority) gave way to a new ethos celebrating individual autonomy, personal freedom, and self-realization.203 For
example, protests about the civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam War led to legal disputes between protestors
and local authorities.204 In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court sided with the protestors.205 Eventually, in a 1969 decision involving student protestors, the Supreme Court held that
peaceful protests were protected by the First Amendment and
explained: “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”206
The ruling prompted an angry dissent by Justice Hugo
Black,207 who had been one of the leading liberals on the Court
from New Deal days until about 1965. Justice Black stated, “[i]t is
a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what
he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases.”208 Justice
Black thought that the rights of the community should be paramount: “[T]axpayers send children to school on the premise that
at their age they need to learn, not teach.”209 He warned: “Change
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 901 (1963).
202 Id. at 932, 955.
203 Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 4, 20 (1964); Emerson, supra note 201, at 878–79.
204 John D. McCarthy & Clark McPhail, The Institutionalization of Protest
in the United States, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS
FOR A NEW CENTURY 83, 85 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998).
205 The Court, however, was not willing to abolish the Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the
State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 767, 770–71 (2010).
206 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 514 (1969).
207 Id. at 515–26 (Black, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 522.
209 Id.
201
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has been said to be truly the law of life but sometimes the old
and the tried and true are worth holding.”210
Justice Black’s dissent is not well remembered. By contrast,
the Court’s free speech decisions from that era have become the
bedrock of our constitutional faith. For many, the First Amendment
right to protest is now the cherished symbol of our nation.211 Indeed, the protestors of that day soon came to be seen as heroic and
more faithful to a higher morality than those who stood by the
government.212 For that reason (and for many other reasons, including the general disillusionment brought on by the Vietnam War
and the Watergate scandal), attitudes toward authority changed. A
new ethic of questioning, challenging, and debunking authority
replaced the old notion of deference.213 Blind obedience and blind
loyalty came to be considered as something bad.214
An insightful article by Steven Smith reasoned through
the new philosophy and found that people (including Americans)
do not have an obligation to regard the laws of their own country
as authoritative.215 Of course, one might choose to comply with a
law for prudential reasons or because the particular law happened
to coincide with one’s own moral code. But there was nothing about
the law having been enacted by one’s own government that creates even a presumptive duty of obedience. Professor Smith concluded that under “modern assumptions, centrally including a
commitment to individual autonomy ... ‘legitimate’ or normatively
attractive authority ... seems impossible, almost inconceivable.”216
A key part of a culture is the attitude of individuals toward
society’s leaders. Willing deference to authority was a cornerstone of
the old loyalty ideal, as well as a hallmark of the New Deal, World
War II generation.217 Americans accepted a regulated, regimented
society, in which loyalty was expected and required, in large part
Id. at 524.
McCarthy & McPhail, supra note 204, at 85.
212 Schmidt, supra note 205, at 768–69.
213 See Steven D. Smith, Hart’s Onion: The Peeling Away of Legal Authority,
16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 97, 133 (2006).
214 Id. at 132.
215 Id. at 117–18, 121.
216 Id. at 133.
217 Id. at 132.
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because of this ethic.218 The new thinking about the proper respect for authority changed a great deal.
For one thing, the new attitude fostered skepticism about
federal government efforts to legislate morality, mandate social
reforms,219 or regulate business. Influential thinkers concluded that
the deficiencies of legislators were far worse than those of corporate
agents,220 and that it would be a mistake to assume that government regulation would be preferable to the free market.221
Distrust of the federal government became the norm. In
1964, 76 percent of survey respondents said Americans could trust
the government in Washington to do what is right most of the time;
however, in 1996, only 19 percent of the respondents to the same
question said the government could be trusted.222
There was also new thinking as to the primacy of individual self-realization and self-fulfillment—first in law review articles,223 then in Supreme Court opinions,224 and then as a matter
of course. A 1992 article by Jana Singer, for example, noted that
the words “‘[c]hoice’ and ‘autonomy’ are becoming synonyms for
‘right’ and ‘good.’”225 In 2002, Evelyn Brody could simply take as
a given that “our broader political structure ... enshrines individual autonomy as its core norm.”226 A 2015 book by Edward
Rubin described self-fulfillment as a moral obligation.227
To be sure, the individualist philosophy was sharply contested both in the general culture and in the legal culture. Many
See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1471, 1485,
1535 (2005).
219 John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 490 (2002).
220 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1990).
221 Id. at 19 n.77.
222 Murray, supra note 196, at ix.
223 Emerson, supra note 203, at 4, 20; Emerson, supra note 201, at 878–79.
224 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
225 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1443, 1538 (1992).
226 Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of
the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 824 (2002).
227 See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE NEW
MORALITY AND THE MODERN STATE (2015).
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people believed in a more community-oriented view in which the
individual was treated as a member of a group and the interests
of the group and its moral code took precedence. 228 But there
was no longer a single dominant moral code for the country to
rally behind.229 An incomplete cultural revolution had left the
nation divided.
On the issue of religion, for example, many believed that
morality should be consistent with the Bible, while many others
regarded the Bible as divisive and unnecessary.230 Conservatives
wanted to restore the values of America’s past. Progressives saw
that past as shameful.231 In their view as expressed in a 2000
article, “we cannot and should not go home again to those homogeneous and exclusionary ... ‘communities of place’—which devalued difference and included elements of subordination.”232
For their part, conservatives had a similarly dim view of the
progressive social agenda, believing that progressives were seeking to destroy conservative communities, religion, values, and culture.233 Progressive efforts to suppress “hate speech” and corporate
campaign contributions were seen by conservatives as attempts to
suppress conservative speech.234 Conservatives also felt threatened by the progressive idea that the government had “an affirmative duty to dismantle unequal conditions between racial
groups created by historical systems of domination or inequities.”235
As a result of these disagreements, many who were sympathetic to communitarian ideals came to see the individualist
position as the only workable compromise.236 The communitarian goal of a shared community based on shared values seemed
228 See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1989).
229 Id. at 2.
230 Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society–
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 305, 325 n.119 (2000).
231 Id. at 338.
232 Id. at 342.
233 Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 317 (2014).
234 Id. at 343.
235 Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 134 (2017).
236 McClain & Fleming, supra note 230, at 325–26.
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impractical, at least at the national level.237 As one article put it,
“Can there be social solidarity ... in a heterogeneous, diverse
society?”238
C. Morals of the Marketplace
Meanwhile, there were big changes in how law and society
viewed the market. Years earlier, Justice Cardozo had described
fiduciary loyalty, “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,”
as something higher than the mere “morals of the market place,”
the standard of behavior “for those acting at arm’s length” that was
“trodden by the crowd.”239 But in the new thinking, that hierarchy
flipped. For many, the morals of the marketplace seemed the
better model.
Loyalty, after all, requires subordination and selfabnegation.240 That is hard to square with what one article described as “our broader political structure that enshrines individual
autonomy as its core norm.”241 Furthermore, as Professor Donald
Langevoort noted, “a legal ethic of service to others” faces difficulties “in a culture that celebrates personal wealth, achievement and consumption.”242
And there was more. By its very nature, loyalty requires
partiality toward those to whom one is loyal.243 We are not loyal
to the world. We are loyal to particular people, groups or entities. The whole idea of allegiance means taking a side. As Columbia Law Professor George Fletcher explained in a 1993 book
on loyalty, “[o]utsiders cannot claim equal treatment with those who
are the objects of loyal attachment.”244 Furthermore, he stated
that these “[l]oyalties circumscribe communitarian circles.”245
Id.
Id. at 342.
239 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
240 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 14–15 (1993).
241 Brody, supra note 226, at 824.
242 Donald C. Langevoort, Psychological Perspective on the Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. REV. 995, 995 (2011).
243 FLETCHER, supra note 240, at 7–8.
244 Id. at 7.
245 Id. at 20.
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These aspects of loyalty became suspect after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 outlawed various forms of discrimination. 246
Traditional loyalty, with its attendant ideas of communitarian
trust and in-group bonding, came to be seen by many as a form
of bias, a source of division, and potential tool of oppression. 247
Professor Frank Cross expressed this view well in a 2005 article
when he said that trust based on shared values is often a “form
of cronyism” or “a cover for racism, sexism, and nationalism.”248
According to Professor Cross, the “idealized past” was an age of
prejudice,249 the in-group bonding produced by its loyalties was
“divisive by its nature,”250 and the social trust created by loyalty
was often an enabler of corrupt and authoritarian governments.251
Proponents of loyalty, particularly in the legal academy,
found it hard to respond. In his book, Professor Fletcher tried to
justify loyalty on emotional grounds as an alternative that “beckons
to those of us who suffer from the rootlessness and anomie of a
society in which families disintegrate, friendships are hard to
maintain, and working relationships are ‘cashed out’ in the capitalist marketplace.”252 But Professor Fletcher had to acknowledge
that loyalty conflicted with the now dominant idea of universal,
impartial moral values and that it was difficult to make a rational, philosophical case for loyalty.253
Loyalty went from being a generally accepted norm to something controversial. And while many institutions stood by the old
loyalty idea (such as the Marine Corps, whose motto remained
semper fidelis), many other institutions backed away. For example,
“[i]n 1972, the Girl Scouts deleted from their handbook the requirement that a scout be ‘loyal.’”254
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Just as loyalty was falling in status, the free market was
gaining.255 Memories of the Depression were fading. Wall Street
seemed a place of vitality and success.256 And the morals of the
marketplace were more in keeping with the new ideals. After all,
the market does not require subordination, self-abnegation, or
discrimination. On the contrary, the market is designed to promote
freedom, individual autonomy, self-realization, informed choice,
and impartial detachment. The free market is also better adapted to
dealing with diversity, complexity, change, and choice.
Professor Fletcher captured the new thinking in his 1993
book when he said: “The exemplar of the marketplace has conquered neighboring arenas. Today we think about relatives, employers, religious groups, and nations the way we think about
companies that supply us with other products and services.”257
The market became the measure of all things.258
To be sure, the idea of loyalty did not vanish. But fewer
people saw loyalty as a moral obligation imposed by society that
the law could enforce. Instead, loyalty was seen more as a potential contract term or as a way of choosing one’s identity through
an act of self-expression.259
One example of the changed thinking involves the expected
relationship between the citizen and the nation. In the past,
loyalty to your country had been a required norm. Think conscription into the military and the Pledge of Allegiance. But that
changed. Loyalty to country became, at best, an option, like brand
loyalty, and not something that the law could require or protect.260
Consider the metaphors that Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Roberts used in the campaign finance cases. Justice Stevens, a
World War II veteran, compared corporate campaign expenditures
to the propaganda broadcasts of Tokyo Rose, an example from
his generation of disloyal speech intended to produce disloyalty
See Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for
Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J.
163, 178 (1997).
256 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, n.160 (1988).
257 FLETCHER, supra note 240, at 3.
258 Id. at 4.
259 James, supra note 235, at 128.
260 See FLETCHER, supra note 240, at 6.
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that was punishable as treason.261 Chief Justice Roberts, by contrast, compared campaign contributions to protestors burning an
American Flag, an example from his generation of disloyal conduct intended to produce disloyalty that is protected by the First
Amendment.262
The same rethinking may be seen in debate over the Oath
of Allegiance required for naturalized citizens. The Oath mandates renunciation of all former allegiances, based on the theory
(as stated in an 1859 opinion of the United States Attorney General) that “no government would allow one of its subjects to divide
his allegiance between it and another sovereign, for they all know
that no man can serve two masters.”263 Today’s legal culture rejects
the idea of the nation as a master and regards the citizen more like
a customer.264 For example, a 1997 article by Peter Spiro argued:
“In a world of liberal states ... the necessity of exclusive allegiances
has largely dissipated” so that “acceptance of dual nationality” is
demanded by “liberal conceptions of citizenship.”265
There was a similar change in the rules governing marriage.
Traditionally, law treated marriage as a status from which it was
difficult to opt out.266 That paradigm was challenged in the 1960s.267
Growing support for “consumer sovereignty and the pursuit of
self-interest in all spheres of life” led legal economists “to celebrate private markets as the ideal form of social interaction in
both the family and nonfamily realms.”268 This new thinking led
to the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, beginning with California in 1969 and covering forty-six other States by 1976.269
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 424–25 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
262 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 191–92 (2014).
263 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 361 (1859).
264 See generally Tom Fox, Treating Citizens Like Customers, WASH. POST
(Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2014
/09/17/treating-citizens-like-customers/?utm_term=.dcb78a18c3e4 [https://perma
.cc/DH7G-HSUL].
265 Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1411, 1416 (1997).
266 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract,
89 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1333 (1998).
267 Singer, supra note 225, at 1523.
268 Id. at 1524–25.
269 Id. at 1472.
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Because of these and other changes, marriage evolved into a relationship “regulated by contractual norms”270 and family
members were “increasingly treated as autonomous individuals.”271
The law no longer concerned itself with ensuring loyalty or group
cohesion. The new emphasis on “individual freedom” and “selfrealization” together with the option of unilateral exit at will
reduced “the potency of societal norms promoting fidelity, loyalty,
and cooperation in marriage.”272
Around the same time, something roughly similar took
place in the workplace. Corporations abandoned their Eisenhower
era paternalism toward employees in favor of an ethic of maximizing shareholder value, a shift chronicled in a recent book aptly
titled The End of Loyalty.273 As June Carbone and Nancy Levit
noted in a 2017 article entitled The Death of the Firm, the idea
of a company as an organic unit was rejected274 and workers
became “fungible commodities” rather than loyal and valued
members of a team.275
Corporate scholars echoed this thought, treating corporations as simply a nexus of contracts and rejecting the idea of any
organic unity.276 In the new environment, as James Nelson noted
in 2015, businesses were “no longer willing to make implicit promises of job security,” so employees could not “make deep and ongoing commitments to those organizations.”277 Identification with
one’s employer (the psychological aspect of loyalty) became dysfunctional.278
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D. The Challenge for Fiduciary Loyalty
These developments shook the foundations of fiduciary
loyalty. The word “loyalty” was no longer an asset for the concept.
Choice was the new norm. The model of contract had become the
dominant paradigm.279 Legal rules governing relationships of all
types were increasingly seen “as resting mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible to alteration by actual bargains.”280
And so, if marriage and citizenship were just contracts and corporations nothing more than a nexus of contracts, it was hard to
see why fiduciary relationships should be treated as anything
other than contractual.
Supporters of this contractarian approach argued that it
was enough to require fiduciaries to keep their word.281 The competitive market for fiduciary services would force them to make the
necessary promises.282 Fencing in amorphous duties through contract would also reduce socially wasteful litigation costs.283 In
addition, treating fiduciary relationships as contractual, and allowing parties to set their own terms, would be consistent with the
general trend in favor of greater freedom. The old rules, the argument went, reflected outmoded pessimism or starry-eyed idealism about how fiduciaries actually conducted themselves. 284
Replacing the moralistic loyalty rhetoric with ordinary contract
norms would bring the law more in line with business reality.285
But there were many who opposed this approach, believing
that it would allow the powerful to escape their moral obligations
through their control of contract forms.286 As the anti-contractarians
saw it, the promotion of individual autonomy and choice was
See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,
105 YALE L. J. 625, 629 (1995).
280 Id. at 630.
281 See Larry E. Ribstein, Symposium: The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust
in the Twenty-First Century, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899,
906–07 (2011).
282 Id. at 907.
283 Id. at 905.
284 Id. at 900, 903.
285 For a good criticism of the overbroad use of fiduciary principles, see
generally Daniel Yeager, Fiduciary-Isms: A Study of Academic Influence on the
Expansion of the Law, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 179 (2017).
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intended to liberate the oppressed, so it would be perverse for these
ideas to be used to enhance the power of the strong.287 The freedom agenda should not mean greater freedom for fiduciaries.288
Elite opinion was divided on this subject. This disagreement might have remained the subject of academic debate alone.
But developments on Wall Street made it relevant for the country
and created a powerful lobby for applying market logic to fiduciary relationships.289
On May 1, 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) ended the New York Stock Exchange’s practice of fixed, noncompetitive brokerage commissions.290 Wall Street profits fell
from “$915 million in 1971 to $188 million in 1977.”291 The industry
had to think outside the fiduciary box in order to survive. No longer
able to rely on large brokerage commissions as a stable source of
revenue, Wall Street needed to find new ways to make money.292
The quest was successful, and then some. The junk bond
fueled takeover boom of the 1980s was just one of many examples of how the securities industry learned to become more creative.293 The innovations made the business much more profitable
and, as a consequence, much more politically powerful.
The political resurgence came at an opportune time. The
New Deal coalition against economic royalists had broken up over
cultural issues.294 Neither party had any particular antipathy
toward Wall Street. Both were eager for its campaign contributions.
Flush with cash, and willing to finance both sides, the financial
services industry found political allies among Democrats and
Republicans.295 The industry used its influence and well-crafted
Id. at 50.
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 37 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988).
289 See id. at 902.
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293 See generally William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional
Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken To Enron To Goldman Sachs, 86
S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2013).
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arguments296 to eliminate barriers to market freedom.297 Stock
prices increased,298 lending credence to the industry position and
leading to still more deregulation.299
Among the rules swept away were New Deal era restrictions
designed to eliminate conflicts of interest in the financial services
industry, such as the separation of the securities business, insurance and commercial banking.300 Firms were able to step outside
their traditional roles and act instead as market participants and
dealmakers.301 To add capital, many firms transformed themselves
from cautious partnerships into profit-maximizing corporations.302
The new business model led to a new ethic. Staid, safe and sound
gave way to aggressive, nimble and opportunistic.303 Wall Street
developed a culture based on constant change, liquidation of
relationships, and a single-minded focus on short-term profits.304
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 303 (1987).
297 See generally Wilmarth, supra note 294; see also J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
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Of course, Wall Street could not do all this on its own. The
industry needed corporations as clients and counterparties. To generate this business, Wall Street encouraged corporate managers
to stop thinking of themselves as stewards of a corporate community and, instead, to think more like owner-entrepreneurs.305
Frequently, managers were incentivized to change their thinking
with deals that gave them greater personal interests in the restructured company. So, Wall Street culture spread.306 “The stable bureaucratic structures of the corporation” were replaced “by
a new institutional structure that value[d] disloyalty, irresponsibility, and immediacy.”307 The market stopped expecting fiduciary behavior from corporate managers, assuming instead that
they would “hold their own personal interests paramount.”308
Large law firms adopted the ethos of their most powerful
clients. Their attitudes toward relationships became more transactional and businesslike. The Chair of the ABA Law Practice Management Section announced that “[t]he ‘commoditization of law’”
was something to be “welcomed and not feared,”309 a sign that
leading lawyers were moving away from the professionalism ideal
toward “treating the practice of law just like any other business.”310
Meanwhile, the cultural change on Wall Street intensified.
A 2013 book by Yale Law Professor Jonathan Macey, The Death
of Corporate Reputation, subtitled How Integrity Has Been Destroyed on Wall Street,311 described how investment banks and
other firms in the securities business found they did not need a
reputation for selfless, fiduciary behavior in order to attract
business. Customer trust expectations were lower, yet the industry was more profitable than ever.312
But there was friction. Legal rules did not keep pace with
changing industry norms, which sometimes resulted in liability.313
See Davidoff et al., supra note 302, at 544–45.
HO, supra note 304, at 247.
307 Id. at 246.
308 Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 239, 240 (2009).
309 Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807,
809 (2017).
310 Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
311 JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 1, 258 (2013).
312 Id.
313 See Davidoff et al., supra note 302, at 529–32.
305
306

654 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:615
For example, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, various
financial institutions settled claims by government regulators
regarding their practices contributing to the crisis.314 “By the
end of 2016, the costs associated with those settlements for the
sixteen largest banks collectively totaled more than $320 billion.”315
A separate, postcrisis matter involving alleged manipulation of
interest rate benchmarks resulted in settlements totaling about
$9 billion,316 while another set of postcrisis charges, relating to
foreign exchange transactions, resulted in regulatory fines of almost
$15 billion.317
There were other practices, before the crisis, that did not sit
well with the old fiduciary rules. For example, firms paid brokers
for steering client business318 and contributed money to government officials to influence “the selection and retention of pension
plan investment advisers.”319 Firms also engaged in practices
adverse to the interests of their customers, such as front running customer orders, betting against customer trades, acting
for multiple parties in the same set of transactions, and advising
customers to become counterparties in complex deals.320
The industry saw these activities as legitimately entrepreneurial. Many firms tried to mitigate their exposure to challenge
under the old fiduciary rules through contracts, disclosures, and
disclaimers.321 But the safeguards did not always work. Here are
See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the “Too Big to Jail” Financial Institutions, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 517 (2018).
315 Id. at 518.
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318 See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 273–85 (3d Cir.
2009) (approving class action settlement over practice of insurance companies
paying contingent commissions to brokers representing insureds); In re Am.
Funds Sec. Litig., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1101–02 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing
suit on statute of limitations grounds because the practice of mutual funds paying
Morgan Stanley for putting the funds on the list of preferred funds had been
reported years earlier). As a plaintiffs’ lawyer, I was involved in litigation challenging the practice of stock-brokers receiving payments for directing customer
order flow.
319 N.Y. Republican St. Comm’n. v. SEC, 70 F. Supp. 3d 362, 364 (D.D.C. 2014).
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some examples (the facts recited are generally allegations by the
plaintiffs and not necessarily true).
According to allegations in an Illinois case, Shahid Khan
came to Deutsche Bank seeking help with a business deal that
required the use of foreign currency.322 The bank advised Khan
to enter into a series of complex foreign currency transactions with
the bank, telling him the deals would either result in his making
money on the deals or incurring tax-deductible losses.323 In fact,
the deals were designed to result in profits for the bank and losses
for Khan that would not be tax deductible.324 After suffering
non-tax-deductible losses on the deals, Khan sued for breach of
fiduciary duty.325
Deutsche Bank argued that Khan had contracted away any
right to fiduciary loyalty by signing a contract early in the relationship that said the bank was not acting as his fiduciary.326
But the Illinois Appellate Court said the allegations supported an
inference that the bank had a relationship of trust with Khan.327
“After all, Deutsche Bank was a prestigious investment bank,
highly sophisticated in its field and capable, by its very name, of
inspiring confidence.”328 The Court went on: “All in all, one could
get the impression that Khan was considerably out of his element and that he more or less was told where to sign.”329
The Appellate Court said the contractual disclaimer of fiduciary duty was void because the bank was already acting as
Khan’s fiduciary when he signed the agreement and to obtain his
informed consent the bank would have had to disclose all relevant
material facts, including the falsity of its prior representations.330
In another case, a technology company needed money.331
The company sought help from a group of lenders and received a
loan, investments, and directors who were affiliated with the
Id. at 137–38.
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lenders.332 The directors from the lenders (the only ones on the
company’s board with financial acumen) arranged a subsequent
loan for the company from the lenders.333 The new loan provided
that in the event the company was liquidated “the lenders would
be entitled to be paid twice the outstanding principal of the loan
plus any accrued but unpaid interest on it; as a result, little if
anything would be left for the shareholders.”334
After the company went bankrupt, it sued the directors and
the lenders alleging that the deal was unfair.335 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Delaware law, held that
the defendants had the burden of showing that the loan terms
were at least as fair to the company as they would have been if
the directors had been loyal to the company.336 The fact that the
directors had disclosed their conflict of interest did not relieve
them of the burden of showing fairness, the Court held, because the
directors still had a duty to be loyal to the company.337 The Court
explained: “A director may tell his fellow directors that he has a
conflict of interest but that he will not allow it to influence his actions as director; he will not tell them he plans to screw them.”338
Another illustrative case arose out of the initial public offering of eToys for which Goldman Sachs acted as the managing
lead underwriter. According to the company, Goldman also agreed
to provide the company with financial advice as to how to price the
offering.339 After receiving Goldman’s input, the company signed
a contract whereby the company would sell its shares to Goldman
and the other underwriters at $18.65 per share and they would
offer the shares to the public at $20 per share, which would give
the underwriters a potential profit of 6.75 percent.340 As it happened, the stock closed at $76.56 on its first day of trading.341
The company later went bankrupt and sued Goldman, alleging that the investment bank had breached its fiduciary duty
Id. at 212–13.
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to the company by not disclosing a conflict of interest.342 More
specifically, the company alleged that Goldman had a secret incentive to advise the company to price its initial public offering below
a fair market price because Goldman had secret arrangements
whereby the firms that purchased stock from Goldman at $20
per share would later pay Goldman 20 percent to 40 percent of
any profits that they made reselling the stock.343
Goldman argued that its relationship with eToys was strictly
contractual and that the contract did not create any fiduciary
duties.344 But the New York Court of Appeals said that under
New York law “fiduciary ‘liability is not dependent solely upon an
agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and the
beneficiary but results from the relation’” so that even if the underwriting contract did not itself establish a fiduciary duty the
company could allege that a relationship of trust apart from the
contract had, in fact, been created.345 The court concluded that the
allegations supported a claim that Goldman had a fiduciary obligation to disclose its conflict of interest with respect to “the
pricing of the IPO.”346
Another case from New York involved short sales by Morgan
Stanley based on non-public information.347 Veleron Holding
borrowed money from BNP Paribas and provided as collateral its
stock in Magna International.348 Veleron was required to post additional collateral if the value of the Magna stock fell below a certain
level.349 The loan agreement had a confidentiality provision.350
BNP engaged Morgan Stanley to act as its Disposal Agent for the
Magna stock in the event a loan default gave BNP the right to sell
the collateral.351 Later, BNP told Morgan Stanley that the value
of the collateral was going down and that Veleron was unlikely
Id. at 30.
Id.
344 Id. at 31.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Veleron Holding, B.V. v. Morgan Stanley, 117 F. Supp. 3d 404, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
348 Id. at 413–14.
349 Id. at 414.
350 Id. at 415.
351 Id.
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to meet a margin call on the loan.352 Morgan Stanley then, acting in
its own capacity, shorted Magna stock (essentially a bet that the
price would go down, done by selling borrowed shares), which
allegedly caused the market price to collapse.353
When Veleron sued Morgan Stanley, the investment bank
argued that it did not have a fiduciary duty of confidentiality because the contract it signed with BNP, even though it designated
Morgan Stanley “BNP’s Disposal Agent” specifically provided that
Morgan Stanley was “‘acting as an independent contractor and
not as a fiduciary ... or in any other position of higher trust.’”354
The district court rejected this argument, holding that, under
New York law, agency relationships carry with them fiduciary
duties as a matter of law.355 The court held that whether the
parties had entered into such a relation was for a jury to decide
based on their actual relationship.356 The language of the contract
was relevant, but not dispositive, because one cannot “avoid a
duty’s being deemed fiduciary in nature by the simple expedient
of refusing to call it by its proper name.”357
From Wall Street’s perspective, these decisions and others
like them represented unwarranted judicial interference with
freedom and the modern market. As the industry saw it, deals
should be governed by the terms of the written agreement and
normal rules of contract construction.358 Except when cabined by
something in writing, economic actors should be free to pursue
their self-interest.359 Courts should not be inserting amorphous
moral duties into private deals.360 That sort of paternalism was
outmoded and reduced overall wealth.361 In the industry’s view,
the definition of fiduciary loyalty needed to be updated to make
it compatible with the new business reality.362
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
354 Id. at 451.
355 Id. at 452.
356 Id. at 453.
357 Id. at 451.
358 See, e.g., Davidoff et al., supra note 302, at 550.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 551.
361 See, e.g., id.
362 See, e.g., id.
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The “contractarian” academic philosophy discussed earlier
was perfectly suited to the task. Scholars following this approach
argued that the same market logic that had discredited other
forms of loyalty should be applied to fiduciary loyalty as well.363
Fiduciary relationships, in their view, were simply contractual
and should be governed entirely by contract norms. 364 There was
nothing special about the duty of loyalty. It was simply (at best)
a set of possible implied contract terms and did not carry any
moral freight.365
So, the prejudice against conflicts of interest was a mistake, John Langbein argued: “Conflicts of interest are endemic in
human affairs, and they are not inevitably harmful. Accordingly,
indiscriminate efforts to prohibit conflicts can work more harm than
good.”366 “The very term ‘conflict’ is an epithet that prejudices our
understanding that some overlaps of interest are either harmless or positively value enhancing for all affected interests.”367
Also outmoded, according to the contractarians, was the
idea that fiduciaries were somehow different from other market
participants.368 For example, a recent article by Dana Remus noted
how “scholars, commentators, and bar leaders alike” have been
pushing the legal profession to adopt the logic of the market.369
Professor Remus observed that their arguments followed a larger
trend.370 “Neoliberal thought, which seeks to extend market
rationalities to all areas of social life, has become the ‘commonsense way’ of our era.”371
The most influential expression of the contractarian view
came in a 1993 article by Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, which said that
the fiduciary duty of loyalty was not a moral obligation but simply
a set of terms that may or may not be implied into particular
contracts.372 According to Easterbrook and Fischel: “The usual
See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12.
Id.
365 Id.
366 John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 935 (2005).
367 Id. at 938.
368 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12.
369 Remus, supra note 309, at 809.
370 Id. at 810.
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economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies apply.
Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing;
they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the
same way, as other contractual undertakings. Actual contracts
always prevail over implied ones.”373
The Easterbrook & Fischel article was well timed. During
the Cold War, an argument for loyalty had been the need to maintain the social order and avoid class conflict. But with the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, free market capitalism no longer had a
rival. The cautionary argument for loyalty lost force. It seemed a
safe time to replace patriarchal relations with the cash nexus.
The case for loyalty was further undermined by the secularization of the legal culture. In the middle years of the twentieth
century, jurists cited the precept from Gospel of Matthew “No man
can serve two masters” to justify the prohibition against fiduciary
conflicts.374 But in the new age, the quasi-religious tone of the
old cases became a talking point for the contractarians. In 1995,
for example, John Langbein denounced the “pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity” of fiduciary duties.375 In 2017, Gabriel
Rauterberg & Eric Talley disparaged the duty of loyalty as a
“long-hallowed ‘sacred cow’ of fiduciary principles.”376
To be sure, the contractarians did not dominate the academy. On the contrary, most fiduciary scholars found secular reasons
for preserving or expanding the fiduciary principle, seeing it as
an important restraint on the powerful and source of protection
for the vulnerable.377
Id. at 427.
Matthew 6:24 (King James).
375 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995).
376 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty
of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1075, 1119 (2017). For a more positive view of the relevance of religion,
see Lyman Johnson, Reflecting on Three Decades of Corporate Law Scholarship,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 677–78 (2017); see also Lyman Johnson, Faith and
Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). See generally
Frankel, supra note 146.
377 See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 146, at 623; Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in
Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 35 TEX. L. REV. 993, 993
(2017); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 925 (2006);
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State courts have generally followed tradition, rejecting
attempts to turn fiduciary duties into contractual ones, except
when the change is mandated by statute. Their prevailing view,
expressed in a 2007 California Appellate opinion, is that: “an
agent’s duty of loyalty arises not from any contract but from the
parties’ relationship.”378
Thus, the remedies for breach of fiduciary duty under State
law go beyond those for breach of contract. Disloyal fiduciaries
may be required to disgorge their ill-gotten gains or forfeit their
fees, even if the plaintiff has not suffered any damage.379 One
justification, as the Indiana Supreme Court explained in 2008, is
that “by promoting the agent’s integrity, the disgorgement rule
facilitates the principal’s trust on which the fiduciary relationship is grounded.”380
State courts have also rejected the contractarian idea that
conflict of interest transactions should be reviewed under normal contract standards.381 Instead, they have followed the traditional, moralistic approach. The examples are legion.
In 2017, the California Supreme Court held that a criminal
conflict of interest statute “should be construed broadly, to ensure
that the public has the official’s ‘absolute loyalty and undivided
allegiance.’”382 In 2014, the Maryland Court of Appeals disbarred an
attorney for borrowing money from a client trust to pay his personal debts, holding that “it is a breach of trust for a trustee to
lend trust funds to himself ... [e]ven where the trustee is authorized
to make such investments as in his absolute and uncontrolled
discretion he may see fit”383 because “it is generally not possible
for the same person to act fairly in two capacities and on behalf
of two interests in the same transaction.”384
Frankel, supra note 146, at 1276; Arthur Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as
the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 99 (2008).
378 Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 537 (App. 2007).
379 See, e.g., Helms & Greene, LLC v. Willis, 773 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. App.
2015); Miller v. Bank of America, N.A., 352 P.3d 1162, 1171 (N.M. 2015);
First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220
(Tex. 2016).
380 Nichols v. Minnick, 885 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2008).
381 See infra notes 382–94 and accompanying text.
382 People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cty., 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 444 (2017).
383 Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Hodes, 105 A.3d 533, 558 (Md.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
384 Id. at 569.
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In 2014, a New York Appellate Court said that the fiduciary’s
“duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty” requires the fiduciary to
avoid “situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty.”385
To like effect from the Wyoming Supreme Court in 2015: “The
duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing by trustees, because ‘[i]t is
not possible for any person to act fairly in the same transaction
on behalf of himself and in the interest of the trust beneficiary.’”386
And from the South Dakota Supreme Court in 2016: “‘A fiduciary must act with utmost good faith and avoid any act of selfdealing that places [his] personal interest in conflict with [his]
obligations to the beneficiaries.’”387
At a minimum, State courts have required conflicted fiduciaries to show that the transaction was fair. As a Texas Appellate
Court explained in 2014: “The presumption of unfairness applies to
transactions between a fiduciary and a principal in which the fiduciary profits or obtains a benefit. ... In such cases, the profiting
fiduciary bears the burden to rebut the presumption by proving
the fairness of the questioned transaction.”388
Or as the Alaska Supreme Court explained in 2015, most
State courts model their standard of review for interested director transactions “after Delaware’s, which requires ‘the [selfinterested] directors to prove that the bargain [was] at least as
favorable to the corporation as they would have required if the
deal had been made with strangers.’”389 The Court went on: “This
exacting standard has come to be known as the ‘entire fairness’
test, and it ‘requires judicial scrutiny regarding both fair dealing
and fair price.’”390
In 2015, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court
voided an arbitration agreement between a doctor and a patient
because the doctor did not make “full disclosure of the nature
and import of the arbitration agreement” to the patient “at or
Pokoik v. Pokoik, 982 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (App. 2014).
Forbes v. Forbes, 341 P.3d 1041, 1058 (Wyo. 2015).
387 Hein v. Zoss, 887 N.W.2d 62, 66 (S.D. 2016).
388 In re Estate of Boyle, No.11-13-00151-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13553, at
*18 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2014).
389 Brooks v. Horner, 344 P.3d 294, 301 (Alaska 2015).
390 Id.
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before the time it was presented for his signature.”391 The normal contract rules did not apply, the Court explained, because a
fiduciary is held to a stricter standard.392 Similarly, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court in 2017 voided an arbitration agreement
in a client engagement letter because the lawyer had not explained
the “scope and effect of that provision” in terms understandable
to the client before obtaining the client’s signature.393 The Court
explained that contract norms did not govern because “attorneys
owe a fiduciary duty of ‘undivided loyalty’ to their clients, a duty
that is derived from the common law” and persists independent
of “codified ethical standards.”394
The contractarians have had better success with State
legislatures. While the basic rules remain in place, some State
statutes have been amended to allow parties to contract out of
traditional duties of loyalty in specific areas. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act, for example, reduces mandatory fiduciary
standards.395 Similarly, the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act permits the drafter of a limited partnership
agreement “to disclaim fiduciary duties, and replace them with
contractual duties.”396
There have been similar changes in corporation law and
practice. For example, a 2017 article by Gabriel Rauterberg &
Eric Talley, found that hundreds of companies have taken advantage of permissive changes in State corporation laws to adopt
charter provisions opting out of the corporate opportunity doctrine,
an aspect of the duty of loyalty that prohibits corporate fiduciaries from competing with the company, evincing “a significant
appetite for contracting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.”397
Trust law and practice has also become more contractarian.
A 2017 article by Adam Hofri-Winogradow, for example, found that
due to changes in trust statutes and new ways of drafting trust
instruments, trusts administered by corporate fiduciaries have
King v. Bryant, 795 S.E.2d 340, 350 (N.C. 2016).
Id. at 349.
393 Snow v. Bernstein, 176 A.3d 729, 736 (Me. 2017).
394 Id.
395 See Eric Talley, Taking the “I” out of “Team”: Intra-Firm Monitoring
and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1001, 1034 (1999).
396 Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 159 A.3d 242, 252 (Del. 2017).
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become more like ordinary contracts.398 The article noted: “The
fiduciary situation has morphed from a relationship to a transaction, with fiduciaries only prepared to bear well-defined and
clearly priced risks, rather than the open-ended protective commitment characteristic of the classical fiduciary.”399 Professor Hofri
concluded: “The transformation of fiduciary practice resembles that
of other social institutions, such as marriage, which were classically
characterized by a long-term open-ended commitment of each
party to the other, as well as by exit difficulties. It expresses the
social alienation and relationship commodification characteristic
of current society.”400
And, as we have seen, the contractarians have done well
in the U.S. Supreme Court. Less bound by precedent than the
State courts, more willing to make policy and more in tune with
the attitudes of large law firms and financial elites, the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly departed from its past
practice and construed federal fiduciary standards in a more
contractarian way.401 While the Court has not completely dropped
the old loyalty rules, the Court seems less and less inclined to
read the old standards into the silences and ambiguities of federal law.402
CONCLUSION
State and federal fiduciary law used to be the same. Now
there is a split. State courts still generally adhere to the traditional standard for regulating fiduciary conflicts (the same
standard that the U.S. Supreme Court followed in the twentieth
century), except when the old loyalty rules have been specifically
modified by statute.403 The U.S. Supreme Court has been loosening fiduciary restrictions on its own.404 State courts treat loyalty
as a moral obligation arising out of a fiduciary relationship.405
Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, Contract, Trust and Corporation: From
Contrast to Convergence, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1715 (2017).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has been dealing with the subject much
more pragmatically and more in keeping with the preferences of
financial elites.406
For supporters of market freedom, the Supreme Court’s new
approach is good news. And for those who prefer a broad construction of fiduciary loyalty, there are more and more reasons
to appreciate the role of State courts in enforcing basic principles of justice.
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